Here is an essay on the ‘Coastal Security of India’ for class 11 and 12. Find paragraphs, long and short essays on the ‘Coastal Security of India’ especially written for school and colleges.
Essay on the Coastal Security
Essay Contents:
- Essay on the Introduction to Coastal Security
- Essay on the India’s Maritime Security-Challenges and Management
- Essay on Managing Challenges for Securing the Coasts and Island Territories
- Essay on the Coastal Security Scheme Phase I and II
- Essay on NC3I Project for Securing the Coasts and Island Territories
Essay # 1.
Introduction to Coastal Security:
For securing the coasts, the Government of India has implemented a three-layered mechanism. At the outermost layer, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft. The intermediate layer comprising the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard. The areas around the land-sea interface are patrolled by the Coastal Police.
On the recommendation of the Task Force, the Indian government launched the coastal security scheme in 2005-06. The scheme envisaged the establishment of ’73 coastal police stations equipped with 204 boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motorcycles for mobility on coast and in close coastal waters’ over a period of five years.
Coastal police stations do not have adequate trained manpower, nor sophisticated arms or patrol boats. The personnel deployed in these police stations are reluctant to undertake sea patrolling. They complain of sea sickness, lack of proper training and absence of high speed patrol boats.
Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the government has also announced a series of measures for strengthening coastal security of the country.
These include:
i. Expediting the implementation of coastal security scheme
ii. Speedy delivery of 204 interceptor boats
iii. Easing of environmental norms for setting up coastal police stations
iv. Issuance of multi-purpose identity cards to all fishermen, sea ferrying personnel and coastal villages
v. Implementation of uniform licensing of fishing boats across the country
vi. Installation of special transponders and global positioning system on registered boats for identification and tracking,
vii. Deployment of commando units of Central Industrial Security Force in all ports
viii. Constitution of a unified command for coastal districts to counter terrorist threats from the sea
For the security of the Island Territories, the Indian Government has set up a joint command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, called the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), comprising personnel of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Coast Guard. Among other responsibilities, the ANC is also mandated to look after the defence of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Essay # 2.
India’s Maritime Security-Challenges and Management:
India has a vast coastline extending more than 7500 km with nearly 1200 islands and a large EEZ (exclusive economic zone.) of about 2 million sq. km. The anticipated addition of 1.2 million sq. km of continental shelf would make India’s total seabed area equal to that of its land mass.
The Indian Ocean, through which much of the world’s ships transit, is distinguished by a land rim on three sides. Maritime access to the region is possible only through certain choke points leading to and from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and from the southern Indian Ocean. India flanks the first two regions and has a central position overseeing the third. Its peninsular feature provides a natural reach across wide sea spaces in all directions, extended by the islands of the Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep island group.
India’s central position in the Indian Ocean Region(IOR), dominating the main International shipping lanes(ISL), gives it a distinct advantage, it places the outer fringes of the IOR and most ‘choke points’ almost equidistant from India, thereby facilitating reach, sustenance and mobility of its maritime forces across the region.
India is therefore well positioned to influence the maritime space, promote and safeguard its national interest across its maritime domain. The vastness of maritime domain demands a significant amount of resources and investment to ensure its security against challenges emanating from the traditional and non-traditional threats.
Challenges:
The greatness of India’s maritime domain with its distinctive geography and shift of global maritime focus from Atlantic-Pacific combine to Indo-Pacific continuum has thrown numerous challenges to its security. These challenges cover the entire range of threats from traditional and non-traditional sources.
Traditional Threats:
The traditional threats emanate from the nation states, it may involve issues like maritime border disputes, claims of maritime resources, strategic interests etc. Presently we face these threats from Pakistan, China and Sri Lanka.
Non-Traditional Threats:
These are the threats from the non-state actors which impact the economy, society, and politics of the concerned states. These include Piracy, terrorism, trafficking, environmental issues, natural disasters etc.
Traditional Threats:
India-Pakistan:
The main concern between India and Pakistan is the dispute of ‘SIR CREEK’. It is a 96 km stretch of estuary in the marshes of ‘RUNN OF KUTCH’, opening into the Arabian Sea, which separates India’s Gujarat and Pakistan’s Sindh.
The long standing disputes hinges on the actual demarcation:
i. From the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of sir creek
ii. From the top of the Sir Creek eastward to a point on the line designated on the western terminus.
iii. Demarcation of maritime boundary between India and Pakistan in the Arabian sea.
The disputed region of Sir Creek has very little strategic or military significance but the region is rich in fishing resources, considered to be one of the largest fishing ground in Asia. The region is expected to be rich in hydrocarbon and shale gas with immense economic potential. If boundary gets defined it would help in determining the maritime boundaries which will further decide the limits of EEZ and Continental shelf.
In 1965 a dispute in this region contributed to the full-fledged war between India and Pakistan. Later ‘Indo-Pak western boundary case tribunal’ was set up to resolve the dispute. The tribunal upheld 90%of India’s claim to the entire Rann leaving the boundary to the south unresolved. Since 1969 there have been eight rounds of ‘composite dialogue group’ held without any breakthrough.
Since neither side has conceded any ground, India has proposed for the demarcation of maritime border first as per the provisions of ‘Technical aspects of laws of sea’ (TALOS). However, Pakistan first wants the dispute to be resolved, taking it for international arbitration, which India has flatly denied citing it a purely bilateral issue.
With both the countries unable to agree on the exact boundary the differences flow into the Arabian Sea creating a vast stretch of disputed waters, where fishermen’s misery, terrorists’ design and global drug syndicates’ interests are all converging. There are indications that this area could be the world’s most active bed for drug trading.
India-Sri Lanka:
India and Sri Lanka have settled maritime boundary demarcation. However, there are few issues still left having direct bearing on the livelihood of the people residing there. Geographically India and Sri Lanka are very close to 1MB e.g. the Palk Strait is just 22 nautical miles (nm) of water that separates the Indian Coast from the Sri Lankan Coast. This proximity results in the encroachment into each other’s territory by fishermen unknowingly resulting into arrests/detention, attacks etc.
In 1974 India agreed to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over a small barren island in the Palk bay area, named “KATCHCHATIVU” with some safeguards to Indian fishermen. However, Sri Lankan government argues against the fishing rights of Indian fishermen in these waters where they have been fishing traditionally. The grant of “KATCHCHATIVU” has endangered the Indian fishermen’s right over the rich fishing waters. Whenever Indian folks stray into the Sri Lankan waters around the island, it leads to skirmishes and incidents.
The period after the defeat of LTTE has seen increased incidences of Indian fishermen coming into conflict with their counterpart in Sri Lanka and also with Sri Lankan Navy. There have been allegations of use of excessive force and even firearms to prevent fishermen from poaching.
India-China:
In the context of security challenges from China to India, the maritime dimension is a relatively new factor. The rapid growth of both economies led to increased demand of energy and raw materials, which are transported by sea. Both the economies are focusing on the sea lanes for the uninterrupted transportation of their trades and energy supply. Thus, Indian navy has newfound commitments in the South China Sea whereas PLA Navy made forays into the Indian Ocean.
If we follow the trade routes of China, 40% of her oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz whereas 82% of her oil imports pass through the Malaccan Strait. Both these strategic shipping lanes are well within the reach and dominance of Indian and US navies. This reality is forcing China to make her presence visible in the Indian Ocean through her ‘string of pearls policy’ in which she seems to encircle and constrict India.
The String of Pearls:
It is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan.
The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centres in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defence report, “Energy Futures in Asia”. The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, but it is often used in Indian media.
The emergence of the String of Pearls is indicative of China’s growing geopolitical influence through concerted efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernize military forces, and foster stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners. The Chinese government insists that China’s burgeoning naval strategy is entirely peaceful in nature and is only for the protection of regional trade interests.
An analysis by The Economist also found the Chinese moves to be commercial in nature. Although it has been claimed that China’s actions are creating a security dilemma between China and India in the Indian Ocean, that has been questioned by some analysts, who point to China’s fundamental strategic vulnerabilities.
Non-Traditional Threats:
Maritime Terrorism:
Terrorism in general has changed the security scenario and it has left no frontiers untouched, be it land, space or sea. In Indian perspective, terrorism in particular, has had a major impact on maritime security preparedness.
The incidents of 1993 Mumbai serial blasts and 26/11 attack on Mumbai are glaring examples of how vulnerable sea routes can be used to infiltrate man and material to target the land. The targets may be soft civilian assets like commercial hubs, population centres, transits, industrial centres, ports, ships as well as conventional military targets of strategic importance and offshore oil facilities or nuclear power plants.
Threats from Sea to Land:
In 1993, the explosives used for Mumbai serial blasts reached western shores of India in boats via sea routes. The 26/11 attack was carried out by a group of terrorists who infiltrated through our porous maritime border.
Threats from Land to Sea:
In early 2000s Al-Qaeda bombed US naval ship USS Cole, killing 17 on board. In 2003 the three Iraqi oil terminals were attacked in the Persian Gulf by explosive laden speed boats. In 2014 Al-Qaeda militants tried to seize a Pakistani naval frigate to target US Navy vessels on northwestern Indian Ocean.
Smuggling:
The high seas are outside the jurisdiction of any single state or agency, hence there is always a reduced scope for the monitoring these areas. The non-state actors involved in the unregulated activities of trafficking/smuggling exploit this opportunity. India having golden crescent on its left and golden triangle on its right is under constant pressure of unregulated movements at sea for trafficking of narcotics and arms.
The traffickers/smugglers follow the modus operandi of trans-shipment of consignments on the high seas into local crafts, which then mingle with fishing activities offshore and can land at any of the myriad landing points ashore. The threat of nuclear material being smuggled in/from our neighboring states is also an alarming dimension to this problem.
Piracy:
Piracy is the oldest form of maritime security threat. It targets trade, putting the economy of the concerned state and lives of the people on board at risk, restricting the freedom of using sea routes for economic growth.
Historically the waters of Gibraltar, straits of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, Madagascar and the English Channel are the most vulnerable routes for pirate raids. The narrow channels with funnel shipping into predictable routes create opportunities for pirates. In the last two decades Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has witnessed increased economic activities owing to increased demand of energy from China and India and their increased trade. This has lured the pirates into this region.
In recent years, Gulf of Aden and Somali based piracy has spread across Arabian Sea within 500 nm of India’s mainland. Strong action from our navy and coast guard pushed them away. Since 2008, Gulf of Aden is being patrolled by our naval ship and helped in escorting more than 3000 merchant ships and nearly 25000 Indian and foreign seafarers.
Illegal, Unreported & Unregulated Fishing (IUU):
IUU is a manifestation of human greed with an assumption that marine resources are an unlimited gift of nature. But it has been realized that marine living resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need to be managed on a sustainable basis. IUU carries the risk of seriously damaging or even destroying living resources, marine environment, bio-diversity and future livelihood of the coastal populace.
As per the 2005 report of FAO (Food & Agriculture Organisation of UN) 75% of fishery resources in south-western Indian Ocean have been finished to their limits while the remaining 25% have been harvested beyond ecological sustainment. It is affecting India as it impacts food and related economic security as well as livelihood of the Indian fishing community.
The prevailing tension between fishermen of India and Sri Lanka in Palk Bay is due to differently perceived claims on fishing area and employment of different fishing methods. Similarly Indian and Pakistani fishermen are subjected to detention by each other’s maritime and law enforcing agencies if they transgress into each other’s areas in the pursuit of big catch.
Climate Change:
Climate change (Global Warming) has manifested in alteration of seasonal temperatures and weather patterns the World over. It has its influence on maritime security with potentially major effects on the future. These are impacts on living resources, possible inundation of low lying coastal areas and islands, the loss of national territory etc.
The current trend of natural disasters like tropical cyclones, tornadoes, floods, coastal and marine inundation may get exacerbated with climatic changes. We must set our priorities right to prepare ourselves to respond in an effective manner.
India’s Maritime Security Management:
Historically India’s seafaring traditions and maritime capabilities, which took it to the shores of south-east Asian countries in the east and shores of Persia, Mesopotamia and Rome on the west, are not documented. When we look into the south-east Asian countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand we find them greatly influenced by Indian culture, language & architecture. Even their dietary habits depict remarkable influences of India.
This is visible across the length and breadth of these regions and it could reach there only through centuries of intense maritime interactions. It is an empirical proof of the seafaring activities and maritime traditions nurtured by a succession of royal dynasties that flourished on India’s eastern seaboard up to 13th century. Similarly Indian marines from the west coast were trading with Persia, Mesopotamia and Rome as far back as 2000-3000 BC.
The last millennium of ‘sea-blindness’ by our rulers and the post-independence ‘lack of strategic direction’ coupled with financial restrain brought our maritime security preparedness to an alarmingly low level. It is only during the last two decades that some factors and incidences forced India to focus on its maritime security management.
These are given below:
i. After the opening of economy in 1990, India witnessed escalation in the international trade and energy requirement. As most of the international trades are carried overwhelmingly by sea, it assumed a prime concern to maintain stability at sea as well as to secure the shipping lanes of the sea from various sorts of threats.
ii. The rise of China as a military and economic power with her arrogant attitude can any time lead to a confrontation with India. The geographical position of India in Indian Ocean Region gives her a chance to balance China’s upper hand in air power and infantry. India needs to be prepared at sea to leverage her geographical advantage.
iii. India has realization of its weakness in marine domain, only after the incidents of Mumbai serial blasts and attack on Mumbai.
iv. The steady GDP growth post liberalization is generating resources/funds for implementation of delayed projects of Indian navy.
Essay # 3.
Managing Challenges for Securing the Coasts and Island Territories:
The 26/11 attack made the Indian government realize the three basic lacunas in the Indian maritime security:
I. The porosity of its coastline
II. Inadequacy in the surveillance of its maritime domain, and
III. Lack of co-ordination among various agencies playing role in maritime security.
To plug these loopholes the coastal and offshore security apparatus has accordingly evolved with an increased role of Indian navy as the central agency with coast guard in support along with the state police and other security agencies.
The measures taken by GOI are mentioned below:
i. Integration of all maritime stakeholders including several states/UTs and central agencies into a new coast line security mechanism, National committee on strengthening maritime & coastal security (NCSMCS), under the cabinet secretary.
ii. Naval commander-in-chief was designated as the Commander-in-chief, coastal police.
iii. The director general, Coast Guard was re-designated as commander, coastal command, and was given the responsibility of overall coordination of central and state agencies in matters of coastal security.
iv. Sagar prahari bal/ocean strike unit created by Indian navy aimed at protection of naval bases and other areas.
v. Sagar suraksha dal an informal group of fishermen and trained volunteers of coastal areas are used for surveillance and intelligence gathering.
vi. Issue of I-cards to all fishermen and over 2 lakh registrations of fishing vessels to facilitate their identification and tracking.
vii. For securing the coastline police of all coastal states/UTs, their administrations, Indian navy, MHA and other central ministries are working in co-ordination. The proposal for coastal security scheme phase-1 and phase-11, formulated on the basis of vulnerabilities/gap analysis carried out by the coastal states/UTs in consultation with coast guard has also been approved.
Essay # 4.
Coastal Security Scheme Phase I and II:
Approved in January 2005 for implementation in 5 years with an extension of 1 year, this scheme stands completed in March 2011. Phase II was approved on 24th September 2010 for implementation from 1st April 2011 for the next five years.
These schemes made provisions for addition of following infrastructures:
A special provision of 60 jetties with up gradation of the existing ones has been made in CSS Phase II. Some key projects of CSS Phase II have been initiated over the last one-and-a-half year.
a. Fast patrol vessels—14 Nos
b. Interceptor boats—20 Nos
c. Offshore patrol vessels—07 Nos
d. Fast interceptor crafts—02 Nos
e. Coast Guard maritime patrol aircraft—06 Nos
f. Coastal surveillance radars—120 Nos
g. Sensors for Directorate of Lighthouses and Light ships
h. Procurement of light helicopters for surveillance and reccee—06 Nos
i. Indian navy has established four JOCs (JOINT OPERATION CENTRES) at Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapattanam and Port Blair resulting in good coordination, synergy and understanding among stakeholders.
ii. The Indian navy has now set up the National Command Control Communication Intelligence (NC3I) that hosts the information management and analysis centre (IMAC). The focus is on building national maritime domain awareness (NMDA) grid via a number of organizational, operational and technological changes. This network connects 51 radar stations (20 Navy and 31 Coast Guards) located along the coasts and the island territory. It will collate, fuse, and disseminate critical intelligence and information about suspicious activities and movements at sea.
iii. The Indian government is in talks with 24 countries for exchanging information on shipping to reinforce the NMDA.
iv. For the security of island territories, the Indian government has set up a joint operation centre on the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Andaman & Nicobar commands comprising personnel of Indian Navy, the Army, the Air force and the Coast Guard.
Essay # 5.
NC3I Project for Securing the Coasts and Island Territories:
India is looking to tie-up with as many as 24 countries for exchange of merchant shipping data, even as its naval intelligence network to track ships in real time has now finally become a reality six years after the 26/11 terror strikes.
The outreach to the 24 countries, spread from Africa’s east coast to well beyond the Malacca Strait, is being led by national security adviser. Though this will take time to fructify, the government is now all set to give the final nod to the national maritime domain awareness (NMDA) project to bolster multi- agency coordination and augment ongoing efforts to strengthen maritime and coastal security.
The overall endeavour is to enable the country to keep track of both conventional and unconventional threats in its primary area of geopolitical interest across the Indian Ocean Region and “neutralize” them if required.
A major step towards this will be the inauguration of the central hub of National Command Control Communication Intelligence (NC3I) network, which can track 30,000-40,000 ships on a daily basis.
Taking feeds and inputs from multiple sources ranging from coastal radars to satellites, the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) at Gurgaon will fuse, correlate and analyse them to assess threats at sea. It’s very easy to guard land borders through fencing, electronic devices and pickets. But at sea, there is no such luxury. The NC3I network will alert us to unusual or suspicious movements and activities at sea.
The bigger plan is to go for the NMDA project, which is now awaiting clearance from the Cabinet committee on security. The NC3I will be the heart or backbone of the NMDA project.
While Navy and Coast Guard are behind the NC3I network, the NMDA project will bring all stakeholders — the several Union ministries dealing with maritime affairs as well as coastal states and Union Territories — on the same grid.
It will then be much easier to intercept a fishing boat like Kuber, which was used by Ajmal Kasab and nine other terrorists to reach Mumbai and unleash havoc during the 26/11 strikes. The carnage exposed the lack of “critical connectivity” between intelligence agencies and security agencies.
As per the blueprint, “state monitoring centres” in coastal states/UTs will act as nodes for the NMDA project, while a shipping hub and fisheries monitoring centre will also be established. The four existing joint operations centres at Mumbai, Kochi, Vizag and Port Blair, set up in the aftermath of 26/11, will also be upgraded.